Religion, Feminism, Freedom / overview

[xvii] This dialogue is historic, for as far as we are aware it is the first formal exchange of ideas by Mormons and humanists. In a pluralistic society, such as America, it is important that people from diverse religious and nonreligious traditions engage in debate to define differences and more meaningfully to discover common ground.

As a representative of humanism, I am often asked, What does the term "humanism," or indeed "secular humanism," mean? The latter term has been attacked by religious fundamentalists on the right for well over a decade. Can "humanism" be defined; or is it like Jell-O, as a friendly critic characterized it, in that it cannot be nailed to a tree or pinned down?

The term 'humanism" means different things to different people. For some, it has been simply identified with the study of the "humanities." For others, it has been used synonymously with "humanitarianism." Its critics have condemned it as a mere form of "godless atheism." Some have considered humanism to be a new religion, and others a new form of anti-religion. Yet even critics would not consider themselves "anti-humanist." Like "democracy," "socialism," "peace," "motherhood," or "virtue," humanism is all things to all men and women.

Is there any way out of this definitioneering impasse? Humanism is not "an ideal essence," laid up in some Platonic heaven of abstract [xviii] meanings. On the contrary, in unraveling its meaning we see that it has been used to justify a set of ethical principles. And in this linguistic controversy there is a central idea that emerges strongly, the idea of freedom. Throughout its long tradition of usage the term "humanism" has embodied the sense of freedom. In particular, humanists have wished to defend the values of the free mind, free inquiry, and free thought.

Humanism has had a long, though checkered, career in human history. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and deepest intellectual traditions of Western civilization. From the great philosophers, scientists, poets, and artists of the Greek and Roman world, through the Renaissance, to the development of the New Science in the sixteenth century, the discovery of the New World, and the democratic revolutions of the modern era, the basic humanist value of liberty has inspired the noble deeds and passions of countless men and women.

The first principle of humanism, thus, is its commitment to the idea of freedom. But what does this mean? First, freedom of conscience within the inward domain of thought and belief; second, the free expression of ideas; and third, freedom of choice in the moral domain. These ideas have been central to American democracy and were among the most cherished of the Founding Fathers. Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, affirmed his opposition to any tyranny over the human mind. And James Madison, chief architect of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, affirmed that government should make no law abridging freedom of speech or press, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. American democracy protects all forms of belief.

Humanism and libertarianism are thus indelibly intertwined. Humanists in the modem world have been the chief critics of the authoritarian or totalitarian state. John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Karl Popper, Sidney Hook, and others have provided a powerful case in defense of democracy. Indeed, the first opponents of fascism and communism are humanist intellectuals who defend the open society.

What is often overlooked in this debate is that liberty may be endangered by other powerful institutions in society which de facto tend to limit the inward domain of conscience, freedom of expression, and moral freedom. I have in mind many established churches, temples, or mosques which may seek to deny the most fundamental [xix] of all human rights: primacy of conscience and the right to believe or not to believe. This is especially evident in Muslim countries today, where there is no separation between church and state, and theocracies repress human freedom. In the name of Allah, Salman Rushdie (an avowed secular humanist) was condemned to death by Iranians as a blasphemer; no one is permitted to dissent from prevailing Islamic doctrines. Extremist Muslim fundamentalists do not simply excommunicate; they seek to execute! In the history of religious persecution, the Roman Catholic Inquisition no doubt stands out as an infamous illustration of the worst-case scenario. But even where there is separation of church and state, churches may have powerful influences on adherents, demanding absolute obedience. The threat of excommunication, the censorship of publications, or the limits imposed on professors are unfortunate illustrations of the power of some churches seeking to enforce discipline in a community. Does a church in a free society have a legal fight to do that? Does it have a moral right, particularly in a pluralistic democracy? A similar question can be asked of powerful economic forces: the coercive sanctions imposed by a corporation or a company town on its employees, or perhaps a union on its members.

In his famous work On Liberty John Stuart Mill presents a set of arguments as to why the rights of the minority need to be respected, including the fights of heretics, dissenters, or iconoclasts. For Mill, the real question is, How do you deal with the tyranny of the majority? Namely, if a majority of people in the community fervently believe that something is true, do they have a fight to exercise coercion, whether subtle or overt, in order to demand conformity to the prevailing orthodoxy? Mill argues that people who deny freedom imply that they are infallible and/or that they have a monopoly of truth or virtue. But who can say with assurance that his or her beliefs have reached their final formulation, and that they alone have the Absolute truth? Is not truth a product of the give-and-take of a free marketplace of ideas, and does it not depend on criticism and response to that criticism if it is to prevail? One should always leave open the possibility that one may be mistaken. Surely the very premise of democracy is that we have something to learn from those who disagree with us. But, says Mill, even if we believe we have the Absolute truth, not to allow it to be contested by dissenters would [xx] mean that it would degenerate into a mere habit of thought. It would lose all conviction and vitality for succeeding generations—unless it were allowed to be challenged. Those who deny freedom of inquiry perhaps mask a hidden fear that if there were really an open debate, they would lose in the end. The censor or inquisitor thus seeks to unfairly impose his or her views by insisting on conformity by everyone.

The point is, quasi-public institutions, such as the Church, Corporation, University, or even public opinion, may be as powerful as the government, and individuals should have the right to dissent in the face of such power. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of freedom of conscience, free expression, and free inquiry is that these freedoms will, in the long run, contribute to the public good and to the progressive development of knowledge, for they allow for the emergence of creativity and the uncovering of new dimensions of truth. By closing the parameters of dissent, the quest for knowledge is restricted. Given the great problems that humankind constantly faces, it is essential that new avenues for the discovery of knowledge be encouraged.

The most awesome attack on freedom in our time was in Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist societies. During the long night of communism, a reign of intellectual terror prevailed, and anyone who disagreed with or defied the doctrine of dialectical materialism was severely punished. If Salman Rushdie stands as the symbol today of the status of freedom in the Islamic world, so Andrei Sakharov, who was a great exponent of secular humanist ideals, symbolizes the yearning for freedom in former Soviet society.

Permit me to apply the idea of freedom very briefly to three areas that we will explore during this dialogue. First, to the question of academic freedom in the university; second, to the scientific investigation of religion; and third, to the area of women's rights.

The university is a unique institution in society, for it has a double function. On the one hand, it is interested in transmitting to students the best knowledge available within civilization and in cultivating an appreciation for the quest for knowledge. This is known as [xxi] Lernfreiheit; that is, it is the right of students to learn and to be able to engage in free inquiry. Students at a university are thus placed in contact with the best minds and the best literature in many domains of human experience and knowledge. They have a right to cultural freedom without censorship or prohibition. The university, however, is especially unique because it is the primary institution committed not only to teaching but to research. Here we need to distinguish the college from the multiversity. What is preeminent is that the university is not only a repository of wisdom and truth in all the fields of human endeavor, but that it provides fertile soil where professors and researchers can come together and explore cooperatively the quest for knowledge. This is what Lernfreiheit presupposes, as its basic principle, academic freedom. Thus universities seek to appoint to their faculties the best qualified minds who are competent in their fields and recognized by peers. A university must give to its faculty the freedom to pursue research, to reach conclusions which, on the basis of their considered judgments, seem to be true, and this entails the right to speak out and publish the results. Any effort by the corporate body to censor or to prohibit this is to deny Lernfreiheit, and this is a betrayal of the very idea of the university itself. Academic freedom has a long and distinguished career, and the great universities—from Oxford, Cambridge, the Sorbonne to Harvard, Stanford, and state universities—respect this right. This not only applies to secular, but increasingly to religious institutions as well.

Authoritarian institutions fear new ideas; they persecute intellectuals; and they seek to deny tenure to their professors. Is there a necessary contradiction between an ecclesiastical institution and a university such that an ecclesiastical institution need not permit Lernfreiheit? If this is the case, then a viable university no longer can be said to exist, and the university has become a place for indoctrination, a seminary; it is not receptive to the quest for truth, nor does it respect the right of dissent. Humanists, of course, will not compromise on this point. To declare an institution a university entails academic freedom untrammeled by the threats of a Grand Inquisitor.

The second theme that we will focus on in this dialogue is the question of what should be the extent or limits placed on freedom of inquiry in regard to religious doctrines. It is again the conviction of the humanist that every domain of human interest, whether [xxii] economics or politics, the social sciences, natural, or biological sciences, history, literature, philosophy, the arts, or religion, should be amenable to critical investigation. This means that there should be no blocks placed on free inquiry. It means that the Koran, the Bible, or the Book of Mormon should be read like any other book, using the best tools of scientific, linguistic, and scholarly research, and that any claims made in these books can be examined critically and evaluated cognitively.

Now there are those who are opposed to this, and who believe that this kind of free inquiry would endanger faith, upset dogma, imperil the body of church doctrines. That may or may not be the case. Surely, if one has little hope that an analysis of belief will survive critical scrutiny, or if one believes that questioning beliefs will lead to their destruction, then so much the worse for the beliefs. If we are truly convinced that our beliefs are true, we ought to permit them to be challenged. And that is why in the area of biblical or Koranic or Mormon criticism, the most advanced tools of scientific, historical, and scholarly analysis should be employed.

The third area for discussion in this dialogue is the question of human rights: to what extent should they be extended to women? Are not women equal in dignity and value? Do not the interests and needs of women deserve equal consideration with those of men? Or should the role of women in various institutions of society be relegated to a submissive position? It is clear that patriarchal attitudes have long dominated our social institutions. The battle of the suffragist movement for the vote gave women political equality. Similarly for the great battles in the economy and in the university today where there is a need to allow women to achieve positions of responsibility. The real question is, Do not the same considerations apply to religious institutions? There are some religions today that believe that women should serve in the pulpit to the same extent as men; that the viewpoints of women are entitled to be heard; that their freedoms should be protected and encouraged; other religions deny this. Is God the Father a male and is sexist language tolerable in a religious context? Humanists agree with the feminist indictment, and indeed many outstanding leaders of the feminist movement worldwide have been humanists, such as Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and Simone [xxiii] de Beauvoir. Hence, the cause of women for liberation is continuous with the cause of freedom.

	Religion, Feminism, and Freedom of Conscience A Mormon / Humanist Dialogue Edited by George D. Smith Signature Books, Salt Lake City; Prometheus Books, Buffalo © 1994 Prometheus Books (cloth), Signature Books (paper). Table of Contents Editor's Introduction Overview: Humanism and the Idea of Freedom Paul Kurtz Part I. Freedom of Conscience 1. The September Six Lavina Fielding Anderson 2. The Politics of Exclusivity Robert Alley 3. Secular and Religious Interpretations of Scripture Gerald A. Larue 4. Freedom of Conscience: Individual Right or Social Responsibility? L. Jackson Newell Part II. Academic Freedom 5. Academic Freedom at Brigham Young University: Free Inquiry in Religious Context Allen Dale Roberts 6. A Humanist View of Religious Universities Vern L. Bullough 7. Academic Freedom Forever; However … Frederick S. Buchanan 8. Tenure as a Tool F. Ross Peterson 9. Religion and Academics at Brigham Young University: A Recent Historical Perspective Gary James Bergera Part III. Feminism 10. A Feminist Comparison of Mormonism and Humanism Bonnie Bullough 11. The Struggle to Emerge: Leaving Brigham Young University Martha Sonntag Bradley 12. Dancing through the Doctrine: Observations on Religion and Feminism Cecelia Konchar Farr Epilogue: The Indispensable Opposition (1939) Walter Lippmann Contributors cover


	Overview Humanism and the Idea of Freedom [xvii] This dialogue is historic, for as far as we are aware it is the first formal exchange of ideas by Mormons and humanists. In a pluralistic society, such as America, it is important that people from diverse religious and nonreligious traditions engage in debate to define differences and more meaningfully to discover common ground. As a representative of humanism, I am often asked, What does the term "humanism," or indeed "secular humanism," mean? The latter term has been attacked by religious fundamentalists on the right for well over a decade. Can "humanism" be defined; or is it like Jell-O, as a friendly critic characterized it, in that it cannot be nailed to a tree or pinned down? The term 'humanism" means different things to different people. For some, it has been simply identified with the study of the "humanities." For others, it has been used synonymously with "humanitarianism." Its critics have condemned it as a mere form of "godless atheism." Some have considered humanism to be a new religion, and others a new form of anti-religion. Yet even critics would not consider themselves "anti-humanist." Like "democracy," "socialism," "peace," "motherhood," or "virtue," humanism is all things to all men and women. Is there any way out of this definitioneering impasse? Humanism is not "an ideal essence," laid up in some Platonic heaven of abstract [xviii] meanings. On the contrary, in unraveling its meaning we see that it has been used to justify a set of ethical principles. And in this linguistic controversy there is a central idea that emerges strongly, the idea of freedom. Throughout its long tradition of usage the term "humanism" has embodied the sense of freedom. In particular, humanists have wished to defend the values of the free mind, free inquiry, and free thought. Humanism has had a long, though checkered, career in human history. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and deepest intellectual traditions of Western civilization. From the great philosophers, scientists, poets, and artists of the Greek and Roman world, through the Renaissance, to the development of the New Science in the sixteenth century, the discovery of the New World, and the democratic revolutions of the modern era, the basic humanist value of liberty has inspired the noble deeds and passions of countless men and women. The first principle of humanism, thus, is its commitment to the idea of freedom. But what does this mean? First, freedom of conscience within the inward domain of thought and belief; second, the free expression of ideas; and third, freedom of choice in the moral domain. These ideas have been central to American democracy and were among the most cherished of the Founding Fathers. Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, affirmed his opposition to any tyranny over the human mind. And James Madison, chief architect of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, affirmed that government should make no law abridging freedom of speech or press, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. American democracy protects all forms of belief. Humanism and libertarianism are thus indelibly intertwined. Humanists in the modem world have been the chief critics of the authoritarian or totalitarian state. John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Karl Popper, Sidney Hook, and others have provided a powerful case in defense of democracy. Indeed, the first opponents of fascism and communism are humanist intellectuals who defend the open society. What is often overlooked in this debate is that liberty may be endangered by other powerful institutions in society which de facto tend to limit the inward domain of conscience, freedom of expression, and moral freedom. I have in mind many established churches, temples, or mosques which may seek to deny the most fundamental [xix] of all human rights: primacy of conscience and the right to believe or not to believe. This is especially evident in Muslim countries today, where there is no separation between church and state, and theocracies repress human freedom. In the name of Allah, Salman Rushdie (an avowed secular humanist) was condemned to death by Iranians as a blasphemer; no one is permitted to dissent from prevailing Islamic doctrines. Extremist Muslim fundamentalists do not simply excommunicate; they seek to execute! In the history of religious persecution, the Roman Catholic Inquisition no doubt stands out as an infamous illustration of the worst-case scenario. But even where there is separation of church and state, churches may have powerful influences on adherents, demanding absolute obedience. The threat of excommunication, the censorship of publications, or the limits imposed on professors are unfortunate illustrations of the power of some churches seeking to enforce discipline in a community. Does a church in a free society have a legal fight to do that? Does it have a moral right, particularly in a pluralistic democracy? A similar question can be asked of powerful economic forces: the coercive sanctions imposed by a corporation or a company town on its employees, or perhaps a union on its members. In his famous work On Liberty John Stuart Mill presents a set of arguments as to why the rights of the minority need to be respected, including the fights of heretics, dissenters, or iconoclasts. For Mill, the real question is, How do you deal with the tyranny of the majority? Namely, if a majority of people in the community fervently believe that something is true, do they have a fight to exercise coercion, whether subtle or overt, in order to demand conformity to the prevailing orthodoxy? Mill argues that people who deny freedom imply that they are infallible and/or that they have a monopoly of truth or virtue. But who can say with assurance that his or her beliefs have reached their final formulation, and that they alone have the Absolute truth? Is not truth a product of the give-and-take of a free marketplace of ideas, and does it not depend on criticism and response to that criticism if it is to prevail? One should always leave open the possibility that one may be mistaken. Surely the very premise of democracy is that we have something to learn from those who disagree with us. But, says Mill, even if we believe we have the Absolute truth, not to allow it to be contested by dissenters would [xx] mean that it would degenerate into a mere habit of thought. It would lose all conviction and vitality for succeeding generations—unless it were allowed to be challenged. Those who deny freedom of inquiry perhaps mask a hidden fear that if there were really an open debate, they would lose in the end. The censor or inquisitor thus seeks to unfairly impose his or her views by insisting on conformity by everyone. The point is, quasi-public institutions, such as the Church, Corporation, University, or even public opinion, may be as powerful as the government, and individuals should have the right to dissent in the face of such power. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of freedom of conscience, free expression, and free inquiry is that these freedoms will, in the long run, contribute to the public good and to the progressive development of knowledge, for they allow for the emergence of creativity and the uncovering of new dimensions of truth. By closing the parameters of dissent, the quest for knowledge is restricted. Given the great problems that humankind constantly faces, it is essential that new avenues for the discovery of knowledge be encouraged. The most awesome attack on freedom in our time was in Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist societies. During the long night of communism, a reign of intellectual terror prevailed, and anyone who disagreed with or defied the doctrine of dialectical materialism was severely punished. If Salman Rushdie stands as the symbol today of the status of freedom in the Islamic world, so Andrei Sakharov, who was a great exponent of secular humanist ideals, symbolizes the yearning for freedom in former Soviet society. II Permit me to apply the idea of freedom very briefly to three areas that we will explore during this dialogue. First, to the question of academic freedom in the university; second, to the scientific investigation of religion; and third, to the area of women's rights. The university is a unique institution in society, for it has a double function. On the one hand, it is interested in transmitting to students the best knowledge available within civilization and in cultivating an appreciation for the quest for knowledge. This is known as [xxi] Lernfreiheit; that is, it is the right of students to learn and to be able to engage in free inquiry. Students at a university are thus placed in contact with the best minds and the best literature in many domains of human experience and knowledge. They have a right to cultural freedom without censorship or prohibition. The university, however, is especially unique because it is the primary institution committed not only to teaching but to research. Here we need to distinguish the college from the multiversity. What is preeminent is that the university is not only a repository of wisdom and truth in all the fields of human endeavor, but that it provides fertile soil where professors and researchers can come together and explore cooperatively the quest for knowledge. This is what Lernfreiheit presupposes, as its basic principle, academic freedom. Thus universities seek to appoint to their faculties the best qualified minds who are competent in their fields and recognized by peers. A university must give to its faculty the freedom to pursue research, to reach conclusions which, on the basis of their considered judgments, seem to be true, and this entails the right to speak out and publish the results. Any effort by the corporate body to censor or to prohibit this is to deny Lernfreiheit, and this is a betrayal of the very idea of the university itself. Academic freedom has a long and distinguished career, and the great universities—from Oxford, Cambridge, the Sorbonne to Harvard, Stanford, and state universities—respect this right. This not only applies to secular, but increasingly to religious institutions as well. Authoritarian institutions fear new ideas; they persecute intellectuals; and they seek to deny tenure to their professors. Is there a necessary contradiction between an ecclesiastical institution and a university such that an ecclesiastical institution need not permit Lernfreiheit? If this is the case, then a viable university no longer can be said to exist, and the university has become a place for indoctrination, a seminary; it is not receptive to the quest for truth, nor does it respect the right of dissent. Humanists, of course, will not compromise on this point. To declare an institution a university entails academic freedom untrammeled by the threats of a Grand Inquisitor. The second theme that we will focus on in this dialogue is the question of what should be the extent or limits placed on freedom of inquiry in regard to religious doctrines. It is again the conviction of the humanist that every domain of human interest, whether [xxii] economics or politics, the social sciences, natural, or biological sciences, history, literature, philosophy, the arts, or religion, should be amenable to critical investigation. This means that there should be no blocks placed on free inquiry. It means that the Koran, the Bible, or the Book of Mormon should be read like any other book, using the best tools of scientific, linguistic, and scholarly research, and that any claims made in these books can be examined critically and evaluated cognitively. Now there are those who are opposed to this, and who believe that this kind of free inquiry would endanger faith, upset dogma, imperil the body of church doctrines. That may or may not be the case. Surely, if one has little hope that an analysis of belief will survive critical scrutiny, or if one believes that questioning beliefs will lead to their destruction, then so much the worse for the beliefs. If we are truly convinced that our beliefs are true, we ought to permit them to be challenged. And that is why in the area of biblical or Koranic or Mormon criticism, the most advanced tools of scientific, historical, and scholarly analysis should be employed. The third area for discussion in this dialogue is the question of human rights: to what extent should they be extended to women? Are not women equal in dignity and value? Do not the interests and needs of women deserve equal consideration with those of men? Or should the role of women in various institutions of society be relegated to a submissive position? It is clear that patriarchal attitudes have long dominated our social institutions. The battle of the suffragist movement for the vote gave women political equality. Similarly for the great battles in the economy and in the university today where there is a need to allow women to achieve positions of responsibility. The real question is, Do not the same considerations apply to religious institutions? There are some religions today that believe that women should serve in the pulpit to the same extent as men; that the viewpoints of women are entitled to be heard; that their freedoms should be protected and encouraged; other religions deny this. Is God the Father a male and is sexist language tolerable in a religious context? Humanists agree with the feminist indictment, and indeed many outstanding leaders of the feminist movement worldwide have been humanists, such as Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and Simone [xxiii] de Beauvoir. Hence, the cause of women for liberation is continuous with the cause of freedom. III The concluding point I wish to raise briefly is the commitment of humanists to reason. Humanists believe that it is essential that we encourage the tools of critical thinking in society. Belief should not simply be a question of faith or dogma, emotion or intuition, custom or authority, but should be guided by informed judgment, an appeal to evidence and logic, and tested in practice. Humanists maintain that there are areas of reliable knowledge that we share, and that truth is not established by authoritative declaration but by objective justification. Thus the idea of freedom as a humanist value is concomitant with the idea of reason, and humanism may also be defined by its commitment to a method of rational inquiry. It is our conviction that we ought to engage in a dialogue with those with whom we disagree, and that we ought not to seek to impose our views on others by power or force, but we ought to listen in a fair and impartial way to claims made in the free marketplace of ideas, and that we ought to try to work out the best we can what seems most likely true on the basis of cooperative, rational inquiry. This is what the following Mormon/humanist dialogue is all about.